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Abstract
Individual CEO characteristics may affect architectural choices through the applica-
tion of managerial discretion. Systems such as organizations and their products are
not purely driven toward modularity because of external forces. Individual CEO char-
acteristics may constitute an additional dimension to established mirroring consider-
ations that impacts both the choice of architecture and the correspondence between
product and organization architectures.
1 | INTRODUCTION
How different pairings of firms’ product architecture and organization
architecture arise and evolve over time, and whether there is a
mirroring across these different architectural levels is subject to a
number of factors both external and internal to the firm (e.g., Colfer,
2007; Colfer & Baldwin, 2016; Sorkun & Furlan, 2017). While origi-
nally proposed in the form “products design organizations” (Sanchez &
Mahoney, 1996), the direction of this so-called mirroring hypothesis
has been questioned. Complementing the original reasoning, Sanchez,
Galvin, and Bach (2013) suggest a “reverse mirroring hypothesis” to
also allow for “organizations designing products.”
Configuring complex systems such as product and organization
architectures and the respective supply chain is a design task
(Baldwin & Clark, 2000; Jacobides, 2005; Puranam, Alexy, & Reitzig,
2014). The design challenge is to create a technical architecture and
corresponding organization architecture that together are capable of
carrying out complex tasks in efficient ways that allow the firm to
compete in dynamic environments. Originating from the literature on
strategic flexibility (Brozovic, 2018; Harrigan, 1985; Sanchez, 1995;
Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996; Worren, Moore, & Cardona, 2002)
scholars put forward the notion that “strategizing managers” seek the
best combination of modular and integrated architecture pairings to
allow the firm to capture value from both gains from specialization
and gains from trade (Sanchez, Galvin, & Bach, 2013; Sanchez &
Mahoney, 2013). A key question is whether such architectural choices
are the result of the “iron cage” of institutional forces and isomorphic
pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) or whether it is the individual
characteristics of top manager's that drive these architectural choices.
While the degree of managerial discretion may vary between indus-
tries, we build our arguments using an upper echelons perspective
(e.g., Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Our analysis is rooted in the assump-
tion that managerial choices are not purely the result of external
forces and that managers and their individual characteristics do
matter.
The extant literature shows empirical support for such a “CEO-
effect” on firm performance (Liu, Fisher, & Chen, 2018; Quigley,
Crossland, & Campbell, 2017; Quigley & Hambrick, 2015). Individual
characteristics such as the CEO's age, tenure, experience, and per-
sonality affect firms’ strategic choices and firm performance (for a
meta-analysis, see Wang, Holmes Jr., Oh, & Zhu, 2016). Following
this rationale, we argue that top managers’ individual characteristics
influence firms’ architectural choices. To build our theoretical posi-
tion, we first summarize the literature on architectural choice and
the mirroring hypothesis. We then present the core findings of the
CEO effect as a conceptual foundation of our analysis. Combining
architectural choice (dependent variable) and CEO effect (indepen-
dent variable) we then derive propositions how individual CEO char-
acteristics affect firms’ architectural choices. The paper ends with a
discussion relating our propositions to the literature on mirroring
and misting and the embeddedness of firm architectures in industry
architectures.JEL classification code: L22.
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2 | MODULARITY, STRATEGIC
FLEXIBILITY, AND ARCHITECTURAL
CHOICES
At its heart, modularity theory considers a system's ability to separate
and recombine its elements without much loss of its functionality on
the basis of assigning functionalities to modules, defining interfaces
between the modules, and enacting standards that allow an assess-
ment of the performance of a module (Baldwin & Clark, 2000;
Campagnolo & Camuffo, 2010; Schilling, 2000). Applying the concept
of modularity to organizations, Sanchez and Mahoney (1996) contend
that the natural boundary of a firm is determined by its production
technology. This mirroring hypothesis (Baldwin, 2008; Colfer, 2007;
Colfer & Baldwin, 2016) specifically links an organization's task struc-
ture to the actions of making and selling the outcomes of individual
tasks. Hence, as products and production technologies change, so do
a firm's task structure and boundaries. While the most common view
is that “products design organizations” (Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996),
there is also empirical evidence for product design following organiza-
tion design (Fine & Whitney, 1996; Fixson & Park, 2008). Hence, the
direction of causality can be of either direction (Campagnolo &
Camuffo, 2009; MacDuffie, 2013). Research to date has moved from
questioning whether mirroring occurs to conditions under which the
mirroring holds, and when hybrid architecture pairings—simultaneous
mirroring and misting—arise (Burton & Galvin, 2018). However, this
research has focused very much on product characteristics
(e.g., product complexity and rate of component change). We posit
that the drivers of architectural choices are likely to go further and as
such we introduce how managerial discretion and individual managers
may affect firms’ architectural choices, and subsequent mirroring and
misting.
Why do managers choose modular or integrated architectures?
The key rationale to choose modular architectures is that they allow
firms to react quicker and more easily to competitive forces; product
modularity is an enabler of firms’ strategic flexibility (Sanchez, 1995;
Schilling & Vasco, 2000; Worren et al., 2002). A modular product
design also allows the firm to organize its product development in a
modular structure, assigning certain development tasks to specialized
actors (Cabigiosu & Camuffo, 2012; Hoetker, 2006). In addition to
using specialized knowledge for each component, a modular architec-
ture has benefits at the architectural level: A modular architecture
allows “each functional element of the product to be changed inde-
pendently by changing only the corresponding component [whereas]
… fully integral products require changes to every component to
effect change in any single functional element” (Ulrich, 1995, p. 426).
As a result of these technical system characteristics firms can (a) more
easily redefine their product strategies, (b) redeploy their chains of
resources in support of these refined product strategies, and
(c) redefine their product offering by including new resources in their
product creation processes (Sanchez, 1995).
While strategic flexibility seems favorable in dynamic environ-
ments, there is also a downside to choosing modular architectures.
Studies on industries in which modular architectures are prevalent
have shown that a shift toward modularity does not come without a
price. First of all, while a modular task structure enables transactions,
modularization is costly (Baldwin, 2008; MacDuffie, 2013). Standard-
izing components and interfaces evokes high ex-ante transaction
costs that only pay off if subsequent transactions are high in number.
Second, the more specialized knowledge in modular architectures
blurs the perception on the “big picture”; modular architectures are
known to lead to a “modularity trap” (Chesbrough & Kusunoki, 2001;
Henderson & Clark, 1990). In modular architectures, learning takes
place mainly at the component level (Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996).
Technological shifts at the architectural level are unlikely because
they are not in the interest of both neither component manufacturers
nor the owners of previously sold products (Chesbrough & Kusunoki,
2001; Galvin, 1999; Henderson & Clark, 1990).
When referring to “”architectures” or “architectural choices” we
subsequently take the (reverse) mirroring hypotheses for granted and
refer to mirrored pairings of product and organization architectures.
Whenever we discuss a hybrid pairing or refer to only one of the
architectures we will explicitly use the terms “product architecture”
and/or “organization architecture”.
Fundamentally, choosing a product and organization architecture
means choosing which markets to target and which value to capture
(MacDuffie, 2013). The different types of value associated with inte-
grated versus modular architectures have been elaborated in detail
(e.g., Sanchez, 2002, 2008). The general notion is that a given perfor-
mance or cost optimization goal for a production system can be
achieved more effectively using an integrated architecture. Vice versa,
modular architectures allow quicker reaction to market changes and
through the plug-and-play capability, the same architecture allows
more product variety. Furthermore, modularization enables transac-
tions (Baldwin, 2008) with other, specialized actors, which in turn
allows to benefit from external economies of scale in intermediate
markets (Jacobides, 2005), and to tap into collective knowledge and
learning processes (Langlois & Garzarelli, 2008). Summarizing all these
effects in an architectural decision making process, Sanchez, Galvin,
and Bach (2013) argue that a firm's joint choice of product and organi-
zation architectures will be driven in important part by its assessments
of value capture through gains from specialization and gains from
trade (Jacobides, 2005; Jacobides & Billinger, 2006; Sanchez, 2008,
2012). A product—for example, a car—may be modular in some func-
tions (e.g., the wheels) and integrated in others (e.g., integrated body).
Because rims and tires are not custom built, car manufacturers can
achieve both gains from specialization and gains from trade by choos-
ing a modular design for the wheels with market standard interfaces.
On the other hand, given performance and/or cost targets in the pro-
duction system can be more easily achieved with an integrated design
for example, for the car body. As a result of these assessments, firms
choose such combinations of integrated and modular components for
which they expect the highest value generation.
Managers also have to choose whether the product and organi-
zation architecture should mirror each other (mirroring) or differ in
total (misted mirror) or in part (partial mirroring and partial misting);
this has been found for example in a study of the laptop computer
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industry (Hoetker, 2006). The factors that lead to “mist in the mirror”
have been identified as high levels of product complexity
(e.g., MacDuffie, 2013; Zirpoli & Becker, 2011) and a high rate of
component change (Furlan, Cabigiosu, & Camuffo, 2014). Also, a
number of contextual product characteristics leads to “simultaneous
mirroring and misting,” “partial mirroring,” or “hybrid pairings”
(Burton & Galvin, 2018).
Summarizing the above literature review on architecture choice
firms seek to create value by choosing combinations of modular or
integrated designs depending on (a) given performance or cost targets
and (b) the availability of specialized knowledge and the cost to con-
nect with (intermediate) markets through which this knowledge can
be accessed.
3 | UPPER ECHELONS THEORY AND CEO
EFFECT
At its core upper echelons theory (UET) argues that firms’ strategic
choices are not purely determined by external factors and that man-
agers do matter. In this article we posit that—as any other strategic
decision—architectural choices also depend on managers and their
individual characteristics. The rationale of UET states that executives
act on the basis of their personal interpretation of the strategic situa-
tion as a function of their experience, values, and personality
(Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Based on the seminal
article by Hambrick and Mason (1984), three UET streams of research
coevolved (Liu et al., 2018). The probably largest and most influential
UET research stream examines which attributes of top management
as a team (e.g., team composition) affect firm performance
(e.g., Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Kilduff, Angelmar, & Mehra,
2000). A second stream—which we focus on—comprises studies of
how individual CEO attributes are related to firm strategy
(e.g., Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007, 2011; Hayward & Hambrick,
1997; Simsek, Heavey, & Veiga, 2010). The results of this research
stream are also known as the CEO effect (e.g., Quigley & Hambrick,
2015). Finally, the third research stream considers how individual
CEO attributes impact top management team (TMT) processes
(e.g., Ling, Simsek, Lubatkin, & Veiga, 2008; Ou et al., 2014; Sim-
sek, 2007).
To derive propositions for architectural choices we focus upon
the CEO effect literature stream. Originating from Hambrick and
Mason's (1984) original model, empirical research has investigated a
variety of performance effects such as diversification, innovation, and
strategic change. Individual attributes as independent variables in the
empirical studies include the CEO's age (Hitt & Tyler, 1991; Yim,
2013), gender (Chen, Crossland, & Huang, 2016; DeJoy, 1992; Eckel &
Grossman, 2008), functional experience (Barker & Mueller, 2002;
Datta & Rajagopalan, 1998), education (Ng & Feldman, 2009), interna-
tional experience (Carpenter, Sanders, & Gregersen, 2001; Khavul,
Benson, & Datta, 2010), and a number of personality attributes
(Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011; Chen, Crossland, & Luo, 2015; Hiller &
Hambrick, 2005; Simsek et al., 2010).
The subsequent sections summarize the arguments on CEO age,
tenure, formal education, prior experience, and personality identified
as key variables in a meta-analysis by Wang et al. (2016).
3.1 | CEO age
Hambrick and Mason (1984) argued that firms led by younger CEOs
take more risk. Younger CEOs have accumulated less personal wealth
than older CEOs; they have less to loose. Hence, young CEOs will be
more likely to initiate aggressive strategic actions to generate personal
and organizational wealth than older CEOs (Yim, 2013). On the other
hand, older CEOs possess more complex cognitive schemes, accumu-
lated and refined during their lifetime. While this provides a larger
knowledge base to assess and interpret new information correctly, it
takes older CEOs more time to learn and to integrate new informa-
tion. Furthermore, older CEOs may have a stronger interest in
protecting their accumulated wealth. As a result, older CEOs might be
more committed to the status quo and less likely to take risk (Serfling,
2014). Empirically, the meta-analysis by Wang et al. (2016) finds that
CEO age is significantly and negatively related to firm risk taking and
product innovation.
3.2 | CEO tenure
CEO tenure is among the most studied CEO characteristics in UET
research (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella Jr., 2009). Because short-
tenured CEOs have less experience in the CEO position, they are
more likely to experiment with different strategies (Hambrick &
Fukutomi, 1991). Later on, as their career advances, CEOs build leg-
acy. The longer their tenure, the less CEOs are willing to put their leg-
acies at risk (Matta & Beamish, 2008). Also, early in their tenure CEOs
are at higher risk of dismissal (Shen & Cannella Jr., 2002); this moti-
vates them to take higher risks and prove their competence
(e.g., Prendergast & Stole, 1996). Empirically, the meta-analysis by
Wang et al. (2016) finds that CEO tenure is significantly and nega-
tively related to strategic risk and strategic change. Furthermore CEO
tenure has a significant and negative relationship with product
diversification.
3.3 | CEO formal education
CEO formal education is a proxy of CEO cognitive ability, empirically
studied as the amount of formal schooling received or the number of
postsecondary degrees CEOs hold. The higher the cognitive ability,
the easier CEOs acquire and process complex information and the
faster they make decisions (Wally & Baum, 1994). Formal education
also may indicate a CEO's openness to novel concepts (Thomas,
Litschert, & Ramaswamy, 1991). Similarly, formal education results in
rich knowledge bases and skill sets that allow CEOs to understand
and process information more quickly and accurately (Kimberly &
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Evanisko, 1981; Ng & Feldman, 2009). Empirically, the meta-analysis
by Wang et al. (2016) shows a positive and significant correlation
between CEO formal education and strategic scope, strategic risk, and
strategic change.
3.4 | CEO experience
Prior CEO career experiences shape CEOs cognitive schemes, how
they perceive and process information, and how they utilize it to make
decisions (Dearborn & Simon, 1958; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Law-
rence & Lorsch, 1967). In particular, the CEO's functional background
(e.g., throughput experience like production) to a high degree deter-
mines which business strategies are pursued and which projects are
given higher priority. Because of their functional perspective and
functional targets, marketing and sales managers set other priorities
than operations or procurement managers. Other aspects of CEO
experience studied in UET research include international experience
(e.g., Khavul et al., 2010), industry experience (Simsek, 2007), and
prior career experience in executive-level positions at other firms
before becoming the CEO (e.g., Zhang, 2008). In general, with experi-
ence CEOs become more comfortable to make decisions and to imple-
ment them (Liu et al., 2018). While the effect of CEO experience is
theoretically sound, due to aggregate measures of experience, the
meta-analysis by Wang et al. (2016) finds no significant support for
general measures of experience. However, an analysis of more spe-
cific experience categories shows a significant and positive relation-
ship between CEO task experience and strategic scope and
strategic risk.
3.5 | CEO personality
UET research on CEO personality typically examines constructs
related to positive self-concept. Individuals with positive self-concept
hold favorable self-images and are more likely to view themselves as
exceptional, potent, admirable, and important (Finkelstein et al., 2009;
Hiller & Hambrick, 2005; Judge, Locke, & Durham, 1997). As positive
self-concept increases, CEOs are more confident in themselves and
their capabilities, are less focused on their own limitations, experience
less anxiety, and are more comfortable making decisions to pursue
“large-stakes initiatives” (Hiller & Hambrick, 2005, p. 311). Empirically,
the meta-analysis by Wang et al. (2016) shows that CEO positive self-
concept is positively associated with the category of strategic risk.
4 | ANALYSIS AND PROPOSITIONS
Modularity has been described as a cognitive frame (MacDuffie,
2013). Only if managers understand the advantages of product modu-
larity and develop the managerial skills to manage modular organiza-
tions they will be able to choose and implement modular strategies
(Baldwin & Clark, 2000; Sanchez, 1995). Sanchez and Mahoney
(2013: 389) explicitly address such “managerial and organizational fac-
tors” as enablers and limitations to pursuing a modular strategy. In
their decision process, managers must first realize the speed and flexi-
bility advantages of modular designs, and second they also must be
willing and able to undertake the strategic organizational change
required to implement modular designs.
In a similar vein, MacDuffie (2013) explicitly differentiates “modu-
larity as frame” as a prerequisite to modularization processes and
modular designs. Based on his analysis of the global automotive indus-
try, he argues that modularity-as-frame drives the directionality of the
interplay between modularity-as-property and modularization-as-pro-
cess. Fundamentally, the concept of modularity is argued to be “a
powerful cognitive frame” (MacDuffie, 2013, p. 37) for managers tak-
ing design choices, reflecting the goals of the senior leader or domi-
nant coalition.
We take the notion of modularity-as-frame as our baseline argu-
ment: managers cognitive frames are a prerequisite for modular
designs, and managers (modular) cognitive frames constitute a third
dimension in the mirroring hypothesis. This leads to our first and sec-
ond proposition regarding the CEO effect on architectural design
choice:
Proposition 1a Managers will choose modular designs (mirrored or mis-
ted pairings of modular product and modular organization design)
only if they possess a cognitive frame of modularity that (a) is
applicable to their firm, and (b) leads to positive evaluations.
Proposition 1b Managers will choose misted or hybrid pairings of prod-
uct and organization design only if their cognitive frame of modu-
larity (a) allows deviations from the mirroring and (b) these
deviations are expected to bear lower risks or to yield better
results.
Applying these baseline hypotheses to the UET model of strategic
choice leads to a model as shown in Figure 1. In addition to the origi-
nal UET model, we posit that individual CEO characteristics will have
a moderating effect on the degree to which the level of product com-
plexity and the rate of component change CEOs affect the isomor-
phism between and mirroring of product and organization
architecture.
We now turn to individual CEO characteristics that are known to
affect CEO's strategic choices and for each of these characteristics we
derive propositions for both the direct effect on architectural choice
and the moderating effect on (partial) mirroring.
4.1 | CEO age
Older CEOs possess more complex cognitive schemes, as may be
necessary to grasp integrated architectures. Hence, younger CEOs
may not be capable to understand the interconnection of integrated
architectures. Furthermore, modular architectures allow firms to
respond to changes in demand more quickly. Taking advantage of
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the plug-and-play functionality of modular architectures requires
quick but less refined learning processes; this is easier for younger
CEOs. Older managers learn slower, but relate new knowledge to
their broad and refined cognitive schemes. Such learning processes
are better suited to enhance an established architecture. On the
contrary, making investments in new components or taking new
suppliers on board in a modular architecture requires a learning
style which is more often found among younger CEOs. Hence, we
posit:
Proposition 2a Older CEOs are more likely to choose integrated archi-
tectures whereas younger CEOs will prefer modular architectures.
We also expect CEO age to affect the effects of both product
complexity and rate of component change on the mirroring hypothe-
sis. High levels of product complexity and a high rate of component
change lead to “mist in the mirror.” Both require quick learning pro-
cesses, which is easier for younger CEOs. We posit:
Proposition 2b The effect of product complexity and rate of component
change on the mirroring hypothesis (misted mirror) will be stronger
for younger CEOs than for older CEOs.
4.2 | CEO tenure
Short-tenured CEOs are more likely to experiment with different
strategies before they build a legacy. Such managerial action is easier
within modular architectures providing a plug-and-play functionality
of the components. Empirically CEO tenure is significantly and nega-
tively related to strategic change and product diversification. This
leads to the assumption that once a strategy proves successful, CEOs
hold on to that strategy with continuing tenure. Consistent strategy
over time does not require strategic flexibility anymore and, therefore,
longer tenured CEOs may focus performance targets within cost con-
straints. From an architectural perspective, such strategic goals are
easier to achieve choosing integrated architectures. Hence, longer
tenured CEOs are more likely to favor integrated architectures.
Proposition 3a CEOs with longer tenure are more likely to choose inte-
grated architectures whereas CEOs with shorter tenure will prefer
modular architectures.
With CEO age, we expect CEO tenure to moderate the effect of
product complexity and rate of component change on the mirroring
hypothesis. High levels of product complexity and a high rate of com-
ponent change can only be mastered with a flexible strategy. This is
more likely for shorter tenured CEOs. We posit:
Proposition 3b The effect of product complexity and rate of component
change on the mirroring hypothesis (mist in the mirror) will be
stronger for CEOs with shorter tenure than for CEOs with longer
tenure.
4.3 | CEO formal education
The higher the cognitive ability, the easier CEOs acquire and process
information, and the faster they make decisions (Wally & Baum,
1994). Empirically, the meta-analysis by Wang et al. (2016) shows a
positive and significant correlation between CEO formal education
and strategic scope, strategic risk, and strategic change. Modular
architectures allow changes in scope and strategic change by changing
individual components based on market demands. To monitor a num-
ber of (potential) markets and to process the respective information
requires higher cognitive abilities than monitoring changes in demand
within the scope of an integrated architecture. Hence we posit:
Proposition 4a CEOs with a higher degree of formal education are more
likely to choose modular architectures whereas CEOs with low for-
mal education are more likely to choose integrated architectures.
CEO formal education and their cognitive abilities also moderate
the effect of product complexity and rate of component change on
the mirroring hypothesis. High levels of product complexity and a high
rate of component change are easier to master with higher cognitive
abilities. We posit:
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Proposition 4b The effect of product complexity and rate of component
change on the mirroring hypothesis will be stronger for CEOs with
more formal education than for CEOs with less formal education.
4.4 | CEO experience
CEO prior career experiences shape CEOs cognitive schemes, how
they perceive and process information, which priorities they assign,
and how they make decisions (Dearborn & Simon, 1958; Hambrick &
Mason, 1984; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). We argue that CEOs with a
functional background in output functions (e.g., sales, marketing) give
higher priority to market requirements and changes in customer pref-
erences. This is easier to achieve using modular architectures. On the
contrary, CEOs with a functional background in throughput functions
(e.g., operations, logistics) will give higher priority to given perfor-
mance goals under cost restrictions. This is easier to achieve choosing
integrated architectures. We posit:
Proposition 5a CEOs with a functional background and task experience
in throughput functions are more likely to choose integrated archi-
tectures whereas CEOs with a functional background and task
experience in an output function will prefer modular architectures.
CEOs functional background and task experience also moderate
the effect of product complexity and rate of component change on
the mirroring hypothesis. High levels of product complexity and a high
rate of component change, because of their task experience, are more
easily recognized and then given higher priority by CEOs with task
experience in an output-oriented function. Vice versa, CEOs with task
experience in a throughput-oriented function will not as easily process
information on high product complexity and high rate of component
change. We posit:
Proposition 5b The effect of product complexity and rate of component
change on the mirroring hypothesis (misted mirror) will be stronger
for CEOs with task experience in output-oriented functions and
will be smaller for CEOs with task experience in throughput-
oriented functions.
4.5 | CEO personality
As positive self-concept increases, CEOs are more confident in them-
selves and their capabilities, are less focused on their own limitations,
experience less anxiety, and are more comfortable making decisions
to pursue “large-stakes initiatives” (Hiller & Hambrick, 2005, p. 311).
Empirically, the meta-analysis by Wang et al. (2016) shows that CEO
positive self-concept is positively associated with the category of stra-
tegic risk. Based on these findings we argue that managing integrated
architectures requires a more positive self-concept than managing a
modular architecture. Because of their plug and play functionality,
modular designs allow to spread risk. While each market interface in a
modular architecture involves dealing with market uncertainty and
behavioral risks of cheating suppliers, each supplier may be replaced
by another supplier. On the contrary, from a risk-taking perspective,
choosing an integrated architecture means putting all eggs in one bas-
ket. We posit:
Proposition 6a CEOs with a less positive self-concept are more likely to
choose modular architectures whereas CEOs with a high positive
self-concept will prefer integrated architectures.
As strategic risk correlates with positive self-concept, we argue
that positive self-concept moderates the effect of product complexity
and rate of component change on the mirroring hypothesis. High
levels of product complexity and a high rate of component change
invoke higher strategic risks than low complexity and a low rate of
change. We posit:
Proposition 6b The effect of product complexity and rate of component
change on the mirroring hypothesis (misted mirror) will be stronger
for CEOs with a high positive self-concept than for CEOs with a
less positive self-concept.
A summary of the above analysis and the main rationale for each
of the CEO characteristics is depicted in Figure 2.
5 | DISCUSSION
In this article we argue that the CEO effect known from UET research
also applies to architectural choices and the mirroring hypothesis.
Fundamentally, we argue that individual CEO characteristics and the
respective cognitive frames constitute a third dimension in the mirror.
Managers only choose modular architectures if they possess a cogni-
tive frame that allows for decomposing the system in modules with
defined functions. The process of modularization will only be started
if managers can grasp the advantages of modular architectures and if
they believe in higher value capture for modular designs in the mar-
kets they serve.
Our analysis of individual CEO characteristics shows that there
are causal relations between CEO characteristics and architectural
choice. Furthermore, individual CEO characteristics also have a mod-
erating effect on the effect of product complexity and rate of compo-
nent change on the type of mirroring. The theoretically derived causal
effects of age dependent learning styles, tenure influencing strategic
flexibility, cognitive abilities limiting or enabling strategic scope, task
experience affecting priorities, and CEO personality as a determinant
of risk taking, all support the notion of a CEO effect on architectural
choice and mirroring.
With our analysis we contribute to both UET and modularity the-
ory. Regarding UET, we expand the range of strategic choices ana-
lyzed by adding architectural choices as a dependent variable. With
our propositions, we show that the general UET model also can be
applied to managers’ architectural choices. Furthermore, we show that
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individual CEO characteristics moderate direct effects from the envi-
ronment on strategic choice. Regarding modularity theory, other than
in Schilling's (2000) seminal article, we highlight that it is not systems
“being driven” or “evolving” or “adapting to changes.” It is managers
that make architectural choices based on their perception of the
external environment and their information processing based on their
individual characteristics. We propose a CEO effect in systems being
modular or integrated.
Our analysis at the moment is pure theoretical reasoning. In a
next step, the propositions will need to be refined and be formulated
as hypotheses that can be put to an empirical test. Future research
should also include findings from the other two streams in UET
research, namely top management teams and the effect of individual
CEO characteristics on top management team processes.
Expanding the findings from this article on architectural choices
at the firm level to architectures at the industry level, future research
should address the question how individual CEO characteristics shape
the evolution of industry standard architectures (Jacobides, Knud-
sen, & Augier, 2006; Sanchez, Galvin, & Bach, 2013). While institu-
tional theory may explain this phenomenon through institutional
forces and mimetic processes at the firm level, this finding may have a
micro-foundation in CEOs with similar cognitive frames based on simi-
lar CEO characteristics. From a UET perspective it would not be sur-
prising that CEOs of similar age and tenure, having served in the same
industry in similar functions, in a given industry environment take the
same architectural choices.
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